by Denis Wallez
November 20th, 2013
illustration (attribution, if any possible, is at the end of the article)
The concept of "intrinsic nature" (svabhava) mostly arose as a post-canonical development. The term itself does not feature in the suttas, and was rare in the canonical Abhidhamma.
In spite of its name, "intrinsic nature" does not indicate a fixed nature of any ultimate phenomenon (dhamma) which would breach the "marks of existence" notably impermanence and selflessness. "Intrinsic nature" still rejects the idea of a 'substance'.
Once the doctrine matured, the dhammas were made indistinguishable from their intrinsic nature.
This was somehow necessary by the very definition of dhammas, meant to be 'irreducible' phenomena: a dhamma may be conditioned (and most are), but by definition it cannot be 'composed'.
The intrinsic nature is thus not a building block of a dhamma, and this was expressed by "dhammas bear their intrinsic natures". Rather, intrinsic nature refers to how a dhamma is distinguished as such. Dhamma and svabhāva could then be used interchangeably (in e.g. the Visuddhimagga).
As previously mentioned, "intrinsic nature" still rejects the idea of a 'substance'. By positing that dhammas bear their own nature, what is rejected is the existence of anything else "behind the scene".
Since the dhammas may be conditioned, the doctrine even indicates that the "dhammas bear their intrinsic nature and are borne by their conditions". Again, the focus on other dhammas as 'conditions' fights off the temptation of assigning a substance or a 'core' to the dhamma at hand.
Finally, "intrinsic nature" is itself an attack against the idea of 'independent' existence of the dhammas.
Since a dhamma is undistinguishable from its intrinsic nature, i.e. its characteristic / function / manifestation, it cannot exist independently from other dhammas (which will allow to 'distinguish' the said nature): this was explored with the notion of 'determination' (parinispanna).
Dhammas are clearly and immutably discriminated. However the discrimination requires 'comparison' or 'contrast', hence prevents independent existence. This also maintains the dhammas as useful to analyse one's 'experience', rather than metaphysical entities.
Unfortunately, and maybe due to the label itself, "intrinsic nature" later was reified by some schools, switching from a phenomenological enquiry (exploring characteristics without presuming ultimate existence) toward ontological statements (affirmation of existence).
This ultimately led the Sarvāstivādins to assert that dhammas exist through the three times, a position rejected by the Theravādins (which kept existence to the 'present'). The Theravādins maintained clarity vis-à-vis the fact that "intrinsic nature" does not precede the arising of a dhamma, nor does a dhamma obtain an intrinsic nature before it manifests. Similarly with cessation. This "intrinsic nature" does not contradict momentariness.
#Buddhism #Theravada #Dharma
image: "intrinsic nature 11" © Chris Valentine and Billy Bogiatzoglou
(www.behance.net/gallery/The-Nature-of-the-Beast-Collaboration/2238844)